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When the lawyers of the American Colonies chose this title
for themselves, they pre-empted the entire legal domain of the
country with all its rights, privileges, business and emoluments.
With full knowledge of the professional distinctions in the mother
country, and especially of the separate powers, functions and
privileges of the two great classes, Attorneys or Solicitors, and
Barristers or Counsellors, they seem to have assumed the title,
Attorneys and Counsellors, with genuine American prejudice
against British classes in all vocations, and with democratic
resolution to abolish such distinctions in their own calling. Suc-
ceeding generations of American lawyers, as tenants in common,
ignoring English precedents, defying common law rules, refusing
division apportionment or specialization, have maintained this
titular union, each and every one claiming and having an interest
in the whole territory and the right to plant and sow and reap
and mow when and where he pleases.
This is both the theory and the condition; and all previous
efforts to change either have proven fruitless. Bills offered in
legislatures to classify legal practice and divide our profession,
as in England, into two great classes, barristers and solicitors,
corresponding with counsellors and attorneys, have uniformly
been rejected; and generally the courts have declined to take any
step toward promoting this classification. We are all admitted
to the same bar, take the same oath and in most states have the
same right to practice in any of the courts from the beginning;
and only a few years waiting is.required before obtaining admis-
sion to the highest tribunal of the land. Ab initio we are all at-
torneys and all counsellors, whatever that may signify; and
that title we hold to the end, and as lawyers can gain no higher.
It means everything, and nothing except-lawyers. We vary it
slightly sometimes, and call ourselves "Attorneys and Solicitors;"
but we mean nothing different by that term than that we ar
lawyers, and can and will go anywhere or do anything befittinf
"Attorneys and Counsellors." Just where or what that may be
is not defined, and one cannot surely know, unless he offends the
sixth sense of some sensitive body and draws forth from court or
from general counsel a warning Cave!
YALE LAW JOURNAL
All sorts of rhetorical phrases are employed by orators and
judies to describe the ideal lawyer, and formulate professional
ethics, with the laudable purpose of elevating professional stand-
ards and regulating professional conduct, which agreeably excite
professional sentiment and receive professional homologation, in
the Scottish sense; and yet they prescribe rules and outline con-
duct as foreign to the American Attorney and Counsellor, as
the precepts of the Pharisees or the formulary of the Vestal
Virgins.
One expresses regret that the American lawyer does not oc-
cupy "that strictly professional relation to the case which the
English barrister enjoys;" and another "cannot agree that the
practice of law has become a business instead of a profession;"
and still another thinks that contingent fees are the Iliad of all
our woes, and those who take them degrade the name of lawyer.
All this is a beautiful vision, transcendentally Utopian. But if
we apply such impossible standards to the "Attorneys and Coun-
sellors" what will become of the American lawyers?
This great army of American lawyers-more than ioo,ooo all
Attorneys and Counsellors-are bound by the common tie of
their oath of office to support the Federal Constitution, and the
constitutions of their respective states; and also "truly and
honestly to demean themselves in the practice of law according
to the best of their knowledge, skill and ability."
The words may vary in the various states;' but the substance
of the obligation taken is the same ubique, semper et ab omnibus.
The gist of the oath is fidelity, the indispensable and crown-
ing virtue of the lawyer; he must be faithful to his client, to the
court and to honor; this is the sum total of official duty-the
Alpha and Omega of obligation. For breach of it in any part he
is amenable to summary discipline by the courts, even to disbar-
ment; and besides he is liable to prosecution or action, common
law or statutory, for wrongs criminal or civil, to the state or any
person natural or legal.
Most states have statutes against barratry; some against
x. In Pennsylvania: "To behave himself in the office of Attorney ac-
cording to the best of his learning and ability, and with all good fidelity to
the Court or to the client, to use no falsehood nor delay any man's cause for
lucre or malice."
In Tennessee: "Truly and honestly to demean himself in the practice of
his profession to the best of his skill and abilities."
In England: "Truly and honestly demean himself in the practice of an
Attorney according to the best of his knowledge and ability."
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maintenance and champerty; and some against contracting for
division of fees with persons not lawyers. Such statutes give
lawful expression to the public policy of the state in regard to
the conduct of lawyers, and, as law, demand the respectful
obedience of all Attorneys and Counsellors.
But what shall we say of the practice and behavior of lawyers
in those states which have no such statutes and policy? Is there
any duty, legal or ethical, requiring obedience to the laws of
other states, or conformity to the practice in other countries or
to the rules and traditions of the English Inns of Court? Is the
American Attorney and Counsellor at Law to be henceforth an
English barrister shorn of contractual power and right to sue
for his fees, a purely professional gentleman without faculty
or privilege to transact legal business for his client or himself?
Such questions are not inopportune under present conditions
and influences, and they are of vital importance to the general
practitioners.
All agree that they are fairly honest and honorable, these
Attorneys and Counsellors; and many believe that, take them as
a whole throughout the entire country, these unbonded trustees
of the business world, these repositories of the business and
domestic secrets of all people, are not excelled by any class or
vocation in probity, integrity, and uprightness. What propor-
tion of these, do the professional puritans suppose, could truth-
fully say-during the past twelvemonth I have not received a
contingent fee? One half? No. One fourth? No. Possibly
one tenth if we count all those who are retained by salary to
give their entire time and talent to the defense of corporations
and these are unanimous in condemnation of contingent fees.
What proportion of American lawyers could say: I have been
strictly professional during the past year, have kept myself clear
of business? Even a smaller proportion than those who take no
contingent fees-for, here the general counsel and their followers
could not be counted.
It is notorious that the vast collection business of America,
small and great, is all conducted by lawyers for contingent fees;
we pay ourselves out of the sums collected; no collection, no fee.
And is not this business too ! What shall we call the skilful
piloting of the vast fleets of corporation craft over the shoals of
law and finance but business.? What other than "business" shall
we call the soliciting of patent-rights and the searching and
passing upon legal titles? None of these things pertain to the
functions of the English barrister, whose fees are earned by the
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conduct of cases in court; who confines himself almost exclus-
ively to the duties of advocacy. His field is grand, but not
varied; his function lofty and purely professional. Often he does
not know his client-never sees him. He takes no feefrom him,
transacts no business for him, does not even prepare his case for
trial. All this has been done by the solicitor, even to the plead-
ings before the barrister is called into the case, which often
happens within a week or even a day before the trial, when the
solicitor hands him simultaneously his fee and his brief, showing
him the matter of contention and the witnesses to prove his case,
with full account of the peculiarities and antecedents of each, to
which is added oral elaboration.
A few counterparts of the English barrister, professional
paragons, there may be at the American bar, possibly one in a
hundred, not more. What shall we say, then, of the ninety and
nine attorneys and counsellors who transact business, or take
contingent fees-are they unworthy? In every city and county
of the United States they may be found, the trusted confidants
of the millions, handling their moneys without bond, buying
and selling their land, administering their trusts, drawing their
deeds and wills, counselling parents, and husbands and wives,
closeting domestic skeletons, managing business, directing
affairs, controlling corporations and conducting lawsuits, doing
all uprightly, honorably, conscientiously; and yet they are
transacting business, and taking contingent fees not only on
collections but in actions for injuries to person, property and
reputation-fees not unlawful nor unworthy, but earned by dili-
gent, skilful, faithful service in open field and honorable con-
test.
Why contrast the American attorney and counsellor with the
English barrister only, when a vast majority of English lawyers
are not barristers, but solicitors conducting the affairs of their
clients as do American lawyers in an honorable, lawful way, and
deserving all praise for it and receiving their reward?
Why say that the vocation of the American lawyer is "not a
business, but only a profession," in these teeming times, when
three-fourths of the business of the country is transacted by
corporations, creatures of the law, endowed, empowered and
regulated by law, and of necessity guided by the hands of law-
yers, most of whom rarely appear in court?
And why censure the majority of American attorneys and
counsellors for taking fees, permitted by law, fairly and hon-
estly earned and not derogatory to professional obligation or
character?
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This censure has never been directed against the commercial
lawyers for charging commissions on their collections. And yet
what is that but taking contingent fees? Is this exemption from
blame awarded because they represent the creditor class or
because the actions which they bring are ex contractuf Their
functions surely belong to "business" rather than "profession;"
and surely there is no logic or law for censuring one class of
lawyers for plaintiff, those who bring actions to obtain compen-
satioh for breaches of social and legal duty, and passing without
query, even, the class who sue for breaches of contract, The
clients of the former are human beings, deserving well of the
profession and of society, and as much in need of faithful, diligent,
skilful service, as the the merchant, or broker, or short loan
man, who has the chattel mortgage on the last piece of house-
hold and kitchen furniture, to secure his discounts. Why the
distinction and the adverse classification?
This new ethical movement for the regulation of attorneys
and counsellors, if not originated by the great insurance, rail-
way, mining and manufacturing .corporations, seems to have
their undivided support. The presidents, directors and general
counsel greatly admire those noble professional institutions of
London, the Inns of Court, and unanimously appreciate and
approve their stringent rules and venerable authority.- They
are true exponents of the common law, existing "time whereof
the memory of man runneth not to the contrary," and their cus-
toms and usages speak to them with the authority of the ages.
Their members not only may not take contingent fees-they
may not invoke the aid of the courts to collect the fees they
have earned, whether upon express or implied contracts; nor
may they soil their hands with any of the details or drudgery of
preparation of cases. They are "called to the bar," set apart
and consecrated to the higher labors of the profession and may
not pursue business methods; a legal aristocracy; professional
earls; whose wives and daughters at all social functions may
enjoy the sweet sense of precedence over their envious sisters,
the wives and daughters of mere solicitors, and thereby may
"maintain the establishment;" gentlemen of independent for-
tune rarely relying upon their fees for their support..
This justly distinguished body of gentlemen, the English
bar, professional sacrosancts of a foreign land, are held up for
imitation to the American attorneys and counsellors, and our
decadence deeply deplored in the hall of the general counsel.
We are actually doing the work of solicitors and attorneys, the
YALE LAW JOURNAL
business of the profession. Just as in England, our clerks
"introduce" clients-as also do other attorneys and solicitors-
and may stipulate for part of the fees. Like the English solici-
tors, we may make advances for our clients and pay the expenses
of his action; or, since lawing may be done on credit in Amer-
ica, we may become his surety for costs, to the end that he may
obtain legal justice in the courts; and some, even, have shocked
the delicate sense of honor of the General Counsel by receiving
conditional fees from the victims of negligence, or fraud, or
their helpless widows in the unequal contest for compensation
which they must need wage with their powerful and conscience-
less adversaries.
And how powerful and united these great corporate influ-
ences are,-witness the general distribution of annual railroad
passes, for the past two decades, to the occupants of the bench,
and, on occasions, the provision of the special car, well stocked
and manned for a trip to Maine or Florida, to Minnesota or Cali-
fornia; and recall the charming candor of President Milton
Smith's explanation-that the railroad lawyers preferred to
appear before judges thus equipped and obligated.
Witness, too, that when the mayor of a great city was grap-
pling in legal contest with a great quasi public corporation for
the protection of the municipality and its citizens against pecu-
niary rapine and plunder he could not find for counsellor among
his fellow-citizens a single lawyer, worthy, able and willing to
perform so noble a civil duty, lest, forsooth, he might transgress
the rules of corporate courtesy, and offend his client, though it
had no legal interest in the cause. And if a great and greatly
plundered city cannot, either for money- or civic loyalty, gain a
lawyer to serve its righteous cause, what chance has one of the
four thousand annual victims of railroad carelessness, or the ten
thousand of mining or manufacturing negligence, to get the ser-
vices of competent counsel unless he, or (generally) she, can
offer some inducement to a lawyer equipped for such a Hercu-
lean task?
Well does the lawyer know the "influences" he must encoun-
ter in his long struggle, in which demurrers, continuances, rules
for additional security, mistrials, caused by "ringers" in the
jury-box, new trials granted exgratia or otherwise, and, more
dangerous than all during this "law's delay" and tlhe hunger and
want following the death of the "bread-winner," the se-cret and
constant plying of his client by skilled agents and hired kinsmen
or friends with the offer of "something sure" instead of the
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uncertainty of a verdict already so long deferred as to make the
heart sick-and shall he wage this unequal contest for years
maybe, without promise of reward for his fidelity, fortitude and
constancy?
But for these virtues, and more, in her faithful, generous
attorneys and counsellors, what hope for compensation for the
unlawful killing of her husband could the widow Schlemmer
have had for correcting the instructed non-suit of the State
judges, who refused her the practical benefit of section 8 of the
railway regulation act, and pronounced her husband guilty of
contributory negligence in raising his head a few inches too
high while making a murderous coupling of cars not lawfully
equipped with an automatic coupler?2 How could she, in her
widowhood and want, have undergone the expense of the writ
of error to a State Supreme Court to get legal justice in the
Federal Supreme Court, unless some good kind friend, like her
counsel, had advanced the money and skill for her benefit?
And yet, say the corporation moralists, you must not stipu-
late for a contingent fee, although it would be proper to await
the result and then take or accept proper compensation! Indeed!
Sit as judge in your own case, or "have a scrap" with your
client over your fee at the end, when agreement beforehand
might have avoided both horns of the ugly dilemma! Is there any
good reason for leaving the solid ground of common sense and
flying into the empyrean for solution of this practical problem
of ethics?
The courts of civilization are substitutes for the bludgeon
and torch of barbarism, and those suffering legal wrongs are
invited to come to them for redress. Widows and orphans of
killed employees must have lawyers to enable them to accept the
invitation. The American attorney and counsellor is rarely a
gentleman of fortune who can afford to carry on such litigation
without fee or reward or the hope or promise thereof. If the
statutes of champerty and maintenance forbid contingent fees
and material assistance, he obeys them, and does the best he
can for himself and client, and if successful, in some way gets
quantum meruit at the end. But if the laws do not forbid it,
and both himself and client prefer to this uncertainty a definite
arrangement, a fixed Per centum of the recovery, what principle
of ethics can forbid the agreement, or deny to himself and client
2. Schlemmer v. Railway Co., U. S. Sup. Ct. Advance Sheets, 15 April,
1907, p. 407.
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in ihnine the right of contract enjoyed by all other citizens, sub-
ject to the same legal and equitable rules?
Some object to the lawyer's interest in the result! But we
are taught by the doctors of the law that devotion to the client's
interest is a lawyer's duty and a virtue. And can it be harmful
that his quantum of interest is certain rather than uncertain?
In nine cases out of ten, the lawyer has no recourse or hope for
compensation except out of the recovery. Others affect to
believe that such services to such parties should be rendered
gratis! That is surely a chivalric view of the subject, and may
control many; but most lawyers are in practice, as other men in
other occupations, not for health nor for glory, but to earn an
honest living for themselves and their families and to lay aside
something for the rainy days.
In fine, the American attorney and counsellor lives in all the
stress and storm of the strenuous life, at the very storm center
of it. He is of flesh and blood like other men and must strive
and cry for his good living. He must keep the law, of course,
in its letter and its spirit, and must teach others so to do. But
when he is so doing he has the same right of contract and of
legal protection as other men. And the words of censure and
depreciation uttered against him for claiming and exercising his
right,-when not the fruit of cant and hypocrisy or the product
of sordid interest and gain,-are readily referable to a sublimated
spirit of ethereal ethics, ill fitting the practical business life of
the American attorney and counsellor of the twentieth century.
Henry H. Ingersoll.
